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DIRECT GAS SALES: ROYALTY
PROBLEMS FOR THE PRODUCER
ARTHUR J. WRIGHT* & CARLA J. SHARPE*"
As anyone familiar with the natural gas industry knows, the past few years have
brought tremendous changes. Beginning with passage of the Natural Gas Policy Act
(NGPA) in 1978,' Congress, the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC),
and our courts have struggled, and continue to struggle, to replace strict governmen-
tal regulation of the industry with a free market where competitive behavior can
flourish. One result of the changes has been the advent of sales by producers of
natural gas directly to end users, distributors or marketers thereof, without an
intermediate purchase by a pipeline, i.e., a "direct sale."
Direct sales by producers differ from "traditional" producer sales to pipeline
purchasers in several respects. Direct sale contracts are typically for short terms
(month-to-month) with market sensitive prices set by negotiations between the
parties. Direct sales are usually specific as to a quantity of gas to be sold within a
specified time frame rather than being tied, as traditional sales have been, to the life
of a specific source. However, even though the direct sale contract is specific as to
quantity, it is also frequently "interruptible," meaning there is no firm obligation to
sell gas and, accordingly, no provision for penalty if either party fails to perform.
In a nutshell, producer direct sales became possible and attractive as a result of
FERC's initiatives in the 1980s. First, FERC encouraged restructuring of traditional
producer-pipeline-consumer relations, resulting in large quantities of gas becoming
suddenly free from regulatory structures (special marketing programs, blanket
certificate programs, and ultimately Order No. 451).2 Then, with Order No. 436,'
which was later vacated4 but ultimately revised and readopted in Order No. 500,'
FERC virtually mandated pipelines to provide "open access" transportation. This
placed most interstate pipelines in the role of transporter rather than merchant. With
* Vice-President-Legal, Delhi Gas Pipeline Corporation, Dallas, Texas. J.D., 1971, University of
Texas; B.A., 1968, Tulane University. The author's prior publications include Contractual Issues in
Marketing Natural Gas, 36 ROcKY MTN. MIN. L. INST. 16-1 (1990).
** Attorney, Delhi Gas Pipeline Corporation, Oklahoma City, Oklahoma, regional office. J.D.,
1984, B.S., 1981, University of Oklahoma. The author joined Delhi in 1990 after six years in private
practice.
1. Natural Gas Policy Act of 1978, 15 U.S.C. §§ 3301-3432 (1988).
2. Ceiling Prices: Old Gas Pricing Structure, 51 Fed. Reg. 27,018 (1986) (also referred to as IIl
FERC Stats. & Regs. 30,701 (1986)).
3. Regulation of Natural Gas Pipelines After Partial Wellhead Decontrol, 50 Fed. Reg. 42,408
(1985) (also referred to as [1982-1985 Regs. Preambles] FERC Stats. & Regs. 30,665).
4. Associated Gas Distrib. v. FERC, 824 F.2d 981 (D.C. Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 485 U.S. 1006
(1988).
5. Regulation of Natural Gas Pipelines After Partial Wellhead Decontrol, 52 Fed. Reg. 30,334
(1987) (also referred to as III FERC Stats. & Regs. ' 30,761 (1987)), appeal docketed sub nom.
Associated Gas Distrib. v. FERC No. 87-1588 (D.C. Cir. 1987).
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a burgeoning reduction in takes by traditional pipelines under existing contracts, a
volatile spot market emerged and the direct sales route was obvious.
6
While the direct sales route is undoubtedly attractive to the producer because of
the ready availability of sales today, it brings with it responsibilities and problems
never before faced by the producer. Interruption of takes may be more frequent if
transportation by a pipeline becomes unavailable. Short notice arrangements for
additional sales may become necessary when an end user's demand increases. Also,
some traditional pipeline functions such as measurement, billing, and control of flow
may become the producer's responsibility.7 Not only do these new problems exist,
but also an age-old -one remains and is accentuated. By embarking on a path of
direct sales, a producer is setting forth into uncharted seas regarding the extent of
his duties of royalty payments to his mineral owners.
This royalty'problem often stems from the mechanism commonly used by the
producer to conduct his direct marketing activities - the marketing affiliate. The
producer establishes an affiliated, but separate, company to conduct all necessary
marketing activities, including marketing for third parties if the producer so desires.
The use of a marketing affiliate by the producer is attractive for at least two
reasons. First, the marketing affiliate can be used by the producer to "capture
margin"; thus, the producer avoids sharing some of the sale proceeds with his
royalty owners. Second, the marketing affiliate can be used by the producer to
conveniently "capture costs" of marketing, therefore allowing the producer to deduct
costs from the sale proceeds payable to royalty owners and other working interest
owners in a specific well.
The legal analysis of the producer's obligations to his royalty owners has always
been complex. The value or price the royalty is to be based on is seldom easily
determined, as evidenced by the great number of royalty owner lawsuits brought
against producers. Also, the producer's use of a marketing affiliate for direct sales
creates another layer of complexity in that legal analysis. Does that "layer" insulate
the producer from liability for a breach of any of his duties to his royalty owner or
enable him to capture margin in his affiliate? The premise of these authors is that
it does not.
The producer's liability to his royalty owners is, of course, determined in large
part by the terms and provisions of the oil and gas lease between them, with the
producer's liability to pay monies to that royalty owner being set by the royalty
clause of the lease. The royalty clause establishes the benefit to inure to the mineral
owner in the event of extraction and production of the covered minerals by his
lessee. In addition to the royalty clause, however, the producer faces yet another
liability to the royalty owner, one not specifically found in the lease: the implied
6. For a more in-dep~h look at the history and development of direct producer sales, see Robert C.
Means & Robert S. Angyal, The Regulation and Future Role of Direct Producer Sales, 5 ENERGY L.J.
1 (1984); Sheila S. Hollis, The Changing Framework of Natural Gas Business and Law, 35 ROCKY MTN.
MIN. L. INST. 14-1 (1989). For a more detailed discussion of the structure of today's gas market and
current contractual provisions and marketing practices, see Arthur J. Wright, Contractual Issues in
Marketing Natural Gas, ?6 ROCKy MTN. MIN. L. INST. 16-1 (1990).




duty to market the gas produced. This article will address the relationship of the
various types of gas royalty clauses to the implied duty to market production when
the producer chooses to "direct market" his gas through use of a marketing affiliate.
Further addressed are the resulting problems he may face when he does so -
problems even more complex and possibly insurmountable than those encountered
by producers in the past.
L Royalty Clauses
There are several varieties of royalty clauses found in oil and gas leases today.
Therefore, any analysis of the legal problems associated with direct marketing must
begin with a determination of what type of royalty clause is in the lease at issue.
Royalty clauses for the production of gas occasionally provide for fixed dollar
amounts or for delivery of gas "in kind" in satisfaction of the lessee's royalty
obligation.' More typically, however, gas royalty clauses, unlike oil royalty clauses,
require the payment of money to the lessor. There are three types of gas royalty
clauses: the market value clause, the proceeds clause, and the hybrid clause. The
clauses are so named because the amount of any payment is determined either by
the market value of the gas, by the proceeds of the sale of the gas, or by a
combination of the market value and proceeds - the "hybrid" royalty clause
A. The Market Value Royalty Clause
The typical "market value" gas royalty clause requires payment of royalties based
on the market value or market price of the gas as determined at the wellhead.
Such market value or market price" is generally defined as that price a willing
buyer would pay a willing seller in a free market - "the price property would bring
when it is offered for sale by one who desires, but is not obligated to sell, and is
bought by one who is under no necessity of buying it."' Market value is,
therefore, a question of fact.
Determination of market value is not an easy task, as courts who have struggled
with the issue would attest. In Piney Woods Country Life School v. Shell Oil
8. For a discussion of fixed and "in kind" royalty clauses, see 3 EUGENE 0. KUNmz, LAW OF OIL
AND GAS §§ 40.2, 40.3 (1989).
9. The hybrid royalty clause typically calls for payment of proceeds for gas sold at the wellhead
and market value for gas sold or used elsewhere. See, e.g., Exxon Corp. v. Middleton, 613 S.W.2d 240
(Tex. 1981).
10. For examples of how the market value royalty clause is used, see TXO v. Vela, 429 S.W.2d 866,
868 (Tex. 1968) (holding that lessee must "pay to lessor, as royalty for gas ... while the same is being
sold or used off of the premises, one-eighth of the market price at the wells of the amount so sold or
used"); Piney Woods Country Life Sch. v. Shell Oil Co., 726 F.2d 225,228 (5th Cir. 1984) (holding that
lessee must pay "on gas ... produced from said land and sold or used, the market value at the well of
one-eighth of the gas so sold or used ...."), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1005 (1985).
11. The terms "market value" and "market price" are, for all practical purposes, interchangeable. See,
e.g., Arkansas Natural Gas Co. v. Sartor, 78 F.2d 924, 927 (5th Cir. 1935), cert. denied, 296 U.S. 656
(1936). But see Shamrock Oil & Gas Corp. v. Coffee, 140 F.2d 409 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 321 U.S.
620 (1944). For the remainder of this article, the term "market value" will be used.
12. Middleton, 613 S.W.2d at 246.
19931
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Co.,3 the Fifth Circuit stated, "The only general rule that emerges ... is that the
method of proof varies with the facts of each particular case."' 4 There may be
substantial differences in the market value of gas even from leaseholds in the same
general area caused by such variations as the quality or pressure of the gas, the
availability and expense of gathering and operating plant facilities. 5 Of course,
differences in judicial opinion exist. Courts in some jurisdictions have found that
under certain circumstances the contract price for gas sold at the wellhead on the
then-current, open, and competitive market establishes market price, while other
jurisdictions disagree. 6 There is widespread agreement, however, that courts may
determine market value of gas, as they often do, using evidence of sales of gas
"comparable in time, quality and availability to marketing outlets."'" The court
in Exxon v. Middleton"8 explained "comparable sales" further:
Sales comparable in time occur under contracts executed contempora-
neously with the sale of the gas in question. Sales comparable in
quality are those of similar physical properties such as sweet, sour, or
casinghead gas. Quality also involves the legal characteristics of the
13. 726 F.2d 225 (5th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1005 (1985).
14. Id. at 238; see also Piney Woods Country Life Sch. v. Shell Oil Co., 905 F.2d 840 (5th Cir.
1990). Some general propositions have, however, been established regarding market value royalty
clauses. See, e.g., Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Ochsner, 146 F.2d 138, 141 (5th Cir. 1944) (holding that
evidence of the value of the gas for purposes other than that for which it is to be used is not admissible
for a determination of mrrket value of the gas as actually used); Phillips Petroleum Co. v, Bynum, 155
F.2d 196, 198 (5th Cir.) (stating that when it is impossible to ascertain market value, royalty may be
based on the actual or intrinsic value of the gas), cert. denied, 329 U.S. 714 (1946); Sartor v. United
Carbon Co., 163 So. 103, 104 (1935) (holding that market value is not measured by the general market
price of gas in a county but by gas comparable in quality, pressure, etc.); Foster v. Atlantic Ref. Co., 329
F.2d 485, 488 (5th Cir. 1964) (holding that evidence of prices paid under long term gas purchase
contracts is not admissible to prove "value" for royalty clause purposes); see also 3 HOWARD R.
WILLIAMS, OIL AND GAS LAW § 650.2 (1992).
15. See WILLIAMS, supra note 14, § 650.2.
16. In Oklahoma and Louisiana, where the lessee enters into a long term gas purchase contract at
arm's length, the price set by that contract will be the market price. See, e.g., Tara Petroleum Corp. v.
Hughey, 630 P.2d 1269, 1273 (Okla. 1981); Hillard v. Stephens, 793 F.2d 189 (8th Cir. 1986); Henry
v. Ballard & Cordell Corp., 418 So. 2d 1334 (La. 1982).
However, Texas, Kansas, and Montana disagree that the price for a long term gas purchase contract,
entered into at arm's length, is the market price. For example, in TXO v. Vela, 429 S.W.2d 866 (Tex.
1968), and Exxon Corp. v. Middleton, 613 S.W.2d 240 (Tex. 1981), the court determined that market
price "means the prevailing market price at the time of the sale or use" and that gas marketed under long
term contracts is sold or used not when the contracts are entered into but when it is delivered to the
purchaser. Thus "the contract price... is not necessarily the market price ...." Vela, 429 S.W.2d at
871; see also Lighteap v. Mobil Oil Corp., 562 P.2d I (Kan. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 876 (1978);
Montana Power Co. v. Kravik, 586 P.2d 298 (Mont. 1978).
The issue of precisely when market value is determined is beyond the scope of this article. For these
purposes, this article will focus on the one generally agreed to method for determining market value and
the method applicable to most direct sales which are made on a monthly basis: comparable sales.
17. Vela, 429 S.W.2d at 872; see also Bowers v. Phillips Petroleum Co.. 692 F.2d 1015 (5th Cir.
1982); Exxon Corp. v. M:ddleton, 613 S.W.2d 240 (Tex. 1981).




gas; that is, whether it is sold in a regulated or unregulated market, or
in one particular category of a regulated market.'9
The Middleton court also stated, "Sales comparable in quantity are those of similar
volumes to the gas in question. To be comparable, the sales must be made from
an area with marketing outlets similar to the gas in question."" As the court in
Piney Woods notes, however, "[clompletely comparable sales are not likely to be
found" due to the wide range of factors that may affect the price of natural gas.2'
Therefore, comparability is a matter left to the court's discretion.'
The market value royalty clause typically requires an evaluation of sales by
other parties (not of sales by the producer in question) to establish comparable
sales and market value. Thus, in most cases, whether the producer is participating
in a direct sale of his gas should be irrelevant. However, it is important to note
that ultimately in Piney Woods, the court determined the comparable sales evidence
to be "unsuitable under the particular facts," finally turning to the "actual-sales-
price-less-costs method"' and a scrutinization of the producer's sales activity. In
Piney Woods, the court applied the same analysis regarding proceeds royalty
clauses and, therefore, essentially converted a market value royalty clause to a
proceeds clause. Thus, where comparable sales do not exist or are deemed by the
court to be unsuitable evidence of market value, as was the case in Piney Woods,
the producer's actual sales may become relevant. Also, like the proceeds royalty
clause, the market value clause will, when applicable, permit deduction of expenses
required to market the gas off the premises.' (Such expenses, and specifically
whether direct marketing expenses are deductible, will be discussed in connection
with -the proceeds royalty clause.) Thus, in some instances, the producer's sales
activity may be relevant even when a market value royalty clause is the subject of
the litigation. The producer's sales activity is very relevant when considering the
second type of royalty clause, the proceeds royalty clause.
B. The Proceeds Royalty Clause
The typical "proceeds" gas royalty clause requires payment of royalties based
on the proceeds acquired by the lessee upon sale of the gas.' Presumably, an
19. Id. at 246. The states are not in agreement whether such "legal" characteristics of the gas are
a component of "quality" of the gas for purposes of determining market value. See. e.g., Matzen v. Cities
Serv. Oil Co., 667 P.2d 337 (Kan. 1983); Holmes v. Kewanee Oil Co., 664 P.2d 1335 (Kan. 1983), cert.
denied, 474 U.S. 953 (1985).
20. Middleton, 613 S.W.2d at 246-47.
21. Piney Woods, 726 F.2d at 239 (emphasis added).
22. For an excellent discussion of determining market value, including methods other than use of
comparable sales, see KUN7, supra note 8. § 40.4.
23. Piney Woods, 905 F.2d at 845.
24. Market value of the gas at the wellhead when sold off the premises is "the market value of the
gas where sold, less the reasonable cost of transporting the gas to the market and the processing
necessary to make it marketable." TXO v. Hagen, 683 S.W.2d 24, 28 (Tex. Ct. App. 1984), ayJd. 31
Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 140 (1987), withdrawn, 760 S.W.2d 960 (Tex. 1988).
25. For examples of the "proceeds" royalty clause, see Warfield Nat'l Gas Co. v. Allen, 88 S.W.2d
1993]
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efficient market establishes a market value at the wellhead which takes into account
expenses necessary to make the gas marketable. "Proceeds" for these purposes is
generally defined as that money lawfully obtained and retained from the sale of gas.6
Further, for these purposes, courts usually restrict the lessee's liability to "net"
proceeds, being "gross proceeds" less "reasonable expenses related directly to the costs
and charges of gathering, processing and marketing the gas.""7 Thus, evidence of the
market value of the gas is generally irrelevant. With the proceeds royalty clause,
courts struggle with different evidentiary matters than they do with market value
clauses. For example, what, if any, expenses and costs are deductible from those
proceeds prior to a payment of the lessee's royalty obligation?
While the producer is bound by the duty to market the gas he produces, the question
of which party should bear related costs often remains to be answered. Traditionally,
the producer pays all costs of exploration and production of gas. This includes the
costs of geophysical surveys of drilling, testing, completing and reworking the well,
and of secondary recovery." The producer's duty is to produce a product at the
wellbore, and, therefore, all associated costs are borne by him. Costs which are
incurred subsequent to production and which are necessary to create a marketable
product are generally shared proportionately by the royalty owner and the producer
where, as is typical, the royalty is payable at the well.' Such post-production costs
include gross production and severance taxes; transportation charges or other expenses
incurred in conveying the minerals produced from the wellhead to the place where a
buyer takes possession thereof; and expenses of treatment required to make the gas
marketable, such as dehydration, purification, and processing.'" There is no
consensus among the various states whether the costs of compression are shared.'
It has not yet been dc cided whether the producer's direct sales costs, including costs
associated with his marketing affiliate, may be included as shared post-production
989 (Ky. 1935) (requiring "the lessee to pay for each gas well from the time and while the gas is
marketed the sum of one-eighth of proceeds received from the sale thereof, payable each three months");
Matzen v. Hugoton Prod. Co., 321 P.2d 576, 578 (Kan. 1958) (requiring the lessee to pay lessor "one-
eighth of the proceeds from the sale of the gas").
26. The term "proceeds" itself implies a sale. Where there are no proceeds, as when gas is used in
plant operations or exchanged, royalty will be based on fair or market value. See Lightcap v. Mobil Oil
Corp., 562 P.2d I (Kan. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 876 (1978); Matzen v. Cities Serv. Oil Co., 667
P.2d 337 (Kan. 1983). See generally Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Johnson, 155 F.2d 185 (5th Cir.), cert.
denied 329 U.S. 730 (1946); Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Record, 146 F.2d 485 (5th Cir. 1944).
27. Matzen v. Hugoton Prod. Co., 321 P.2d 576, 582 (Kan. 1958).
28. See WILLIAMS, supra note 14, § 645.1.
29. Matzen, 321 P.2d at 581-84; Piney Woods, 726 F.2d at 228.
30. See WILLIAMS, supra note 14, § 645.2. There is no consensus whether the cost of separators
and the expense of measurement for royalty purposes are to be shared burdens. Id. § 645.3.
31. See Wood v. TXO, 854 P.2d 880 (Okla. 1992). Oklahoma, Kansas, and Arkansas do not allow
a producer to deduct compression costs from his royalty payments because, these states argue, installation
of compression is a necessary expense in the process of making the gas marketable. Schupbach v.
Continental Oil Co., 394 P.2d I (Kan. 1964). Louisiana and Texas, on-the other hand, represent the
majority opinion that compression costs are properly deductible because they are post-production costs
necessary to move produced gas from the wellhead to the purchaser's pipeline. Martin v. Glass, 571 F.




costs. However, based on cases decided regarding other post-production services
which enhance the value of the gas, such costs arguably should be included. Marketing
costs of a third party not affiliated with the producer would normally be considered to
be post-production services and deductible under a proceeds royalty clause. The
counterpoint to this view is that traditionally the costs which are derived from the
producer's in-house marketing efforts have not been deducted from the royalty owner's
share of the proceeds of production. Given eighty years or more of industry
interpretation that in-house marketing costs are not deductible, it is doubtful that a
producer could suddenly change his practice and deduct the burgeoning costs
associated with the large marketing departments so many producers have established.
However, the deductibility of in-house marketing expenses remains a matter to be
determined by litigation. In any event, when a proceeds royalty clause is controlling,
the producer's methods of marketing the gas are relevant in determining his royalty
liability. As will be seen, courts will carefully scrutinize those marketing practices,
particularly when an affiliate of the producer is involved in that marketing.
I1. The Implied Duty to Market
As noted above, the producer is bound not only by the express terms of his oil and
gas lease, but also by covenants implied therein. 2 The Texas, Supreme Court has
noted that the implied obligations are as important as the lease terms themselves;
"implied obligations are as much a part of the lease and are just as binding as though
... expressed."33 The lessee's implied duties have been given various definitions but
are traditionally divided into the four phases of operation: exploration, development,
production (including marketing), and protection against drainage.'
Today, the covenant which is the subject of this article, the implied covenant to
market, is widely recognized. 5 Addressing the lessee's marketing obligation to the
royalty owner under both market value and proceeds gas royalty clauses, the court in
Craig v. Champlin Petroleum Co.' said,
32. The doctrine of implied covenants "is designed to determine what constitutes fair and reasonable
dealing between any lessor and his lessee in the implementation of their general intention that the lessee
is to develop the leased premises for their mutual advantage." See KUNTZ, supra note 8, § 54.3.
33. See Clifton v. Koontz, 325 S.W.2d 684 (Tex. 1959).
34. See MAURICE H. MERRILL, THE LAW RELATING TO COVENANTS IMPLIED IN OIL AND GAS
LEASES § 4 (2d ed. 1940). Merill describes the lessees implied duties as (1) the implied covenant to drill
an exploratory well; (2) the implied covenant to drill additional wells; (3) the implied covenant for
diligent and proper operation of the wells and for marketing the product, oil or gas is discovered in
paying quantities; and (4) the implied covenant to protect against drainage by wells on adjoining lands.
Id.
There are three general implied covenants, obligating the lessee to (1) reasonably develop the
premises; (2) protect the leasehold; and (3) manage and administer the lease (which includes the duty
to reasonably market). Cabot Corp. v. Brown, 754 S.W.2d 104, 106 (Tex. 1987).
35. See HOWARD R. WILLIAMS & CHARLES J. MEYERS, OIL AND GAS LAW § 804 (1964); KUNTZ,
supra note 8, § 55.1.
36. 300 F. Supp. 119 (,V.D. Okla. 1969), rev'd on other grounds, 435 F.2d 933 (10th Cir. 1971).
1993]
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The defendant, Champlin Petroleum Company, as lessee under oil and gas
leases ... has an implied duty and obligation in the exercise of reasonable
diligence, as a prudent operator, with due regard for the interest of both
lessor and lessee, to obtain a market for the gas produced.., at a prevail-
ing market price .... "'
Thus, the structure of the producer's marketing efforts and the calculation of royalties
due his royalty owner; will be tested not only by the language of his oil and gas lease,
but by the implied covenant to market production.
The implied covenant to market is generally viewed as "two-pronged: the lessee
must market the production with due diligence and obtain the best price reasonably
possible."" In so doing, the "standard of care applied to test [his] performance... is
that of a reasonably prudent operator under the same or similar circumstances."3 In
other words, the producer must act as a reasonably prudent operator would in
marketing his production, including due diligence to obtain the best possible terms for
the sale.4" And in some jurisdictions, under a market value royalty clause, the
producer must obtain the best current price reasonably obtainable." Such broad
language, implying a continuing obligation of the producer to obtain the highest price
objectively possible for gas he produces, can, as will be discussed, cause significant
problems for the producer upon a court's review of his marketing efforts.
The implied duty to market may have a significant effect on a proceeds royalty
clause. As discussed above, under aproceeds clause, the royalty owneris entitled only
to his share of the producer's sale proceeds. However, those proceeds may be deemed
inadequate, entitling the royalty owner to relief, if the producer has breached his
implied duty to market production. In Amoco Production Company v. First Baptist
Church of Pyote,42 the court concluded that the lessee must "act fairly and in good
faith with regard to the interest of a lessor of a mineral interest."43 In First Baptist
Church, the lessee entered into a long-term contract with a purchaser to sell gas
produced from the plaintiff royalty owners' well at approximately one-half the amount
at which gas was then being sold to other purchasers from the same well, and with no
right to a future price re determination. At the same time, and from the same purchaser,
37. Id. at 125.
38. Cabot, 754 S.W.2d at 106; Weymouth v. Colorado Interstate Gas Co., 367 F.2d 84 (5th Cir.
1966); Bristol v. Colorado Oil & Gas Corp., 225 F.2d 894 (10th Cir. 1955); Molter v. Lewis, 134 P.2d
404 (Kan. 1943); Strange v. Hicks, 188 P. 347 (Okla. 1920). The prudent operator standard is statutory
in Louisiana. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 31-122 (West 1988).
39. Cabot, 754 S.W.2d at 106; see also Strange v. Hicks, 188 P. 347 (Okla. 1920); Molter v. Lewis,
134 P.2d 404 (Kan. 1943); Hurd Enter. Ltd. v. Bruni, 828 S.W.2d 101 (Tex. Ct. App, 1992); Amoco
Prod. Co. v. Alexander, 622 S.W.2d 563, 567-68 (Tex. 1981) (holding that the reasonably prudent
operator concept is an essential part of every implied covenant in oil and gas leases).
40. Foster v. Atlantic Ref. Co., 329 F.2d 485 (5th Cir. 1954); Gazin v. Pan-American Petroleum
Corp., 367 P.2d 1010 (Okla. 1961); Cabot Corp. v. Brown, 754 S.W.2d 104 (Tex. 1987).
41. Cabot, 754 S.W.2d at 106.
42. 579 S.W.2d 280 (Tex. Civ. App. 1979), writ refd n.r.e. per curian, 611 S.W.2d 610 (Tex.
1980).




Amoco received an upgrade on a low, fixed-price contract involving production from
leases other than those covering the plaintiffs' mineral interest. The court concluded
that Amoco breached its duty to market the gas in spite of the fact that the plaintiffs
had signed division orders."
The First Baptist Church court went further to find that the lessee will be held to
stricter scrutiny of his marketing performance when the interests of the lessor and
lessee are not identical.4 The First Baptist Church court quotes Professors' Williams
and Meyers:
The greatest possible leeway should be indulged the lessee in his decisions
about marketing gas, assuming no conflict of interest between lessor and
lessee. Ordinarily the interests of the lessor and lessee will coincide; the
lessee will have everything to gain and nothing to lose by selling the
product. Where the interests of the two diverge and the lessee lacks
incentive to market gas, closer supervision of his business judgment will
be necessary.'
Professors Williams and Meyers go on to say in that section that "whatever shortcom-
ings in lessee's conduct may be revealed by hindsight, the covenant is not breached if,
at the time, an ordinary prudent operator might have followed such a line of action."47
The Professors admonish courts to exercise restraint in "second-guessing" the lessee's
marketing decisions, warning that "scrutiny of the lessee's actions by judges (or,
worse, juries) in the light of after-acquired knowledge will tend to encourage the
operator to take the least hazardous and perhaps least profitable course of action."4
Of course, a producer does not undertake management and development of property
for the sole benefit of his lessor. Courts recognize this and the substantial burden
borne by the producer and will not require him to subordinate his interest to that of his
lessor so long as the interests of the two coincide. 9 But where the court perceives a
conflict, it will jealously defend the rights of the lessor." In First Baptist Church, that
44. Amoco asserted that it was protected from liability because the royalty owners had signed
division orders requiring payments based on "net proceeds at the wells." The court said, however, that
a division order "does not purport to relieve the lessee from its duty to exercise good faith in obtaining
market value for gas sold," its main purpose being protection of a purchaser of production in making
distribution of payment. The division order does "not diminish the duty owed to [the] royalty owners."
First Baptist Church, 579 S.W.2d at 288.
45. Id. at 285.
46. Id. at 286 (quoting WILLIAMS & MEYERS, supra note 35, § 856.3).
47. See WILLIAMS & MEYERS, supra note 35, § 856.3.
48. Id.
49. Id.
50. See, e.g., TXO v. Hagen, 683 S.W.2d 24 (Tex. Ct. App. 1984), affd, 31 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 140
(1987), withdrawn, 760 S.W.2d 960 (Tex. 1988); TXO v. Parker, 716 S.W.2d 644 (Tex. App. 1986);
Amoco Prod. Co. v. Underwood, 558 S.W.2d 509 (Tex. Civ. App. 1977). In a recent case, Hurd Enter.,
Ltd. v. Bruni, 828 S.W.2d 101 (Tex. Ct. App. 1992), the Texas Court of Appeals considered whether
there was a breach by a producer as to his royalty owners of the duty of good faith and fair dealing with
respect to marketing obligations. The court held that a "confidential relationship [a special relationship
of trust and confidence] must exist to give rise to the duty of good faith and fair dealing." Id. at 112.
Because there was no evidence that the relationship between the parties was any more than that of
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conflict existed because the potential price for gas produced under one lease was
traded to upgrade the price under another. Thus, there was a clear conflict between the
interest of the royalty owner and the producer, resulting in a lower royalty check being
mailed to the plaintiff; - a result the court found unacceptable.
One other aspect of the reasonably prudent operator standard that can cause
significant problems for the producer interested in direct sales is the concept that each
royalty owner must be treated as though he is his producer's only lessor. In Amoco
Production Co. v. Alexander,5' the court considered a producer's implied obligation
to protect his lessor's field from local drainage. There, royalty owners in a water-drive
field brought suit against Amoco, a common lessee in the field, for breach of contract,
alleging failure to protect the plaintiffs' lease from drainage, tort damages, and
"intentional acts and omissions" undertaken to increase Amoco's production from other
"updip" leases. The Alexanders' lease was downdip. Amoco had increased production
on its updip leases, causing downdip leases, including the Alexander lease, to "water
out" sooner than they otherwise would.
In considering Amoco's actions, the court, as is typical, held Amoco to the
reasonably prudent operator standard of conduct. However, the court went on to hold
that the said standard "is not to be reduced to" any one lessor simply because the
producer "has other les sors in the same field.""2 As for the plaintiffs, the producer had
the duty to do whatever a reasonably prudent operator would do if the [plaintiffs] were
its only lessor in the field.53 Explaining, the court said:
The conflicts of interest of Amoco, as a common lessee, cause us concern.
The Alexander leases provided for 1/6th royalty while Amoco's updip
leases provided for 1/8th royalty. There is no economic incentive for
Amoco to increase production on the Alexander lease because it will
eventually recover the Alexanders' oil updip....
... These conflicts would not occur if Amoco was not a common lessee
(lessee common to downdip and updip lessors). If the Alexanders were
the only Amoco lessor, their interests would more nearly coincide.'
The court therefore held that the "reasonably prudent operator standard is not to be
reduced to the Alexanders because Amoco had other lessors in the same field.
Amoco's status as a common lessee does not affect its liability to the Alexanders.""
In sum, case law regarding the implied covenant to market production provides
much ammunition to royalty owners in their battles with producers. Not only will the
producer be held to strict scrutiny when his interests do not coincide with those of his
lessor, but that lessor will be viewed by a reviewing court as the producer's only lessor,
even where that producer is a common lessee with many lessors in a given area. Such
lessor/lessee, and was "purefy a business relationship," no confidential relationship and therefore no duty
of good faith and fair dealing existed. Id. at I 11.
51. 622 S.W.2d 563 (Tex. 1981).
52. Id. at 569.
53. Id. at 570 (emphas s added).





broad, sweeping statements by courts serve only to spawn litigation and confusion, as
illustrated infra.
Il. Recent Cases Regarding the Implied Marketing Covenant
Two recent cases highlight the problems that can occur when the implied marketing
cases we have discussed are applied to actual situations involving marketing gas. In
Shelton v. Exxon Corporation," the U.S. district court found that Exxon "breached
its duty ... to prudently market gas under market value clause of gas leases."' Exxon
had classified the gas produced from wells in which the plaintiffs had a royalty interest
as section 109 gas. Exxon argued that because the price of such gas was limited by the
NGPA section 109, the market value of the gas for royalty purposes was the section
109 price." At that time, it was clear under applicable Texas law that the market
value of gas for purposes of a market value royalty clause could not exceed its
regulated price. 9 The plaintiffs argued that prior to 1978, the effective date of the
NGPA, Exxon should have dedicated the plaintiffs' gas to new contracts which would
have qualified it under section 105(b)(2) of the NGPA and, accordingly, a higher
regulated price and higher royalty. The plaintiffs urged that Exxon's failure to do so
was a clear breach of the implied covenant to prudently market the gas.
Exxon had marketed and sold the plaintiffs' gas under long-term "corporate
warranty" contracts which required Exxon to sell a specified volume of gas, regardless
of the source, for the term of the contract.' Exxon argued that it could not market the
plaintiffs' gas other than under the warranty contracts because the gas was being
"effectively committed or dedicated" to those contracts.6 The court rejected Exxon's
argument, holding that Exxon was legally free to commit the plaintiffs' gas to the
contracts proposed by the plaintiffs because corporate warranty contracts do not
"designate the origin of gas to be supplied";62 in other words, specific gas is never
dedicated to such a contract. Exxon also argued that the corporate warranty contracts
were not imprudent marketing when the contracts were first executed. However, the
court said that that question was not the issue; rather, "[t]he real issue is whether it was
imprudent for Exxon to continue marketing the [plaintiffs'] gas as it previously had."'
Exxon argued that it acted as a reasonably prudent operator in originally entering
into the warranty contracts and that it was not imprudent for it to continue to do so
even after passage of the NGPA. Further, once the market had changed, a reasonable
56. 719 F. Supp 537 (S.D. Tex. 1989), rev'd on other grounds, 921 F.2d 595 (5th Cir. 1991).
57. Id. at 545.
58. Id.
59. Id.; see also First Nat'l Bank v. Exxon Corp., 622 S.W.2d 80, 81 (Tex. 1981) (holding that under
a "market value" lease, market value cannot exceed the regulated price).
60. "Warranty contracts" are distinguishable from "dedication contracts" wherein the seller only
obligates itself to sell whatever gas is producible from the wells or leases which are specifically dedicated
to the contract for its term. See Gulf Oil Corp. v. Federal Power Comm'n, 563 F.2d 588 (3d Cir. 1977),
cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1062 (1978).
61. Shelton, 719 F. Supp. at 546.
62. Id.
63. Id. at 547 (emphasis added).
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prudent operator "would not have entered into the contracts in question because it
would have been costly to use high-priced gas purchased on the open market to fulfill
its corporate warranty contracts in order to allow the [plaintiffs'] gas to be sold at
market value."' The court agreed with Exxon that the duty owed by it was that of a
reasonable prudent operator under the same or similar circumstances. However, it
rejected Exxon's arguments, stating that such "outside costs," ones that "arise from
Exxon's overall, company-wide marketing plan and represent risks inherent to long-
term corporate warranty contracts," should not be included as "factors in deciding what
a reasonable, prudent operator would do to market the gas."'0
The court found that Exxo'n's commitment of the plaintiffs' gas to low-priced
warranty contracts subordinated the rights of the royalty interest owners to Exxon's
own financial gain, that gain being "its interest in fulfilling its corporate warranties
without having to purchase gas on the open market."' The Shelton court picked up
on the sweeping generalization in Alexander which, in its simplest form, held that the
lessee's duty is to do that which would be done by a reasonable, prudent operator
holding only the lease in question. The Shelton court agreed by saying,
[T]he reasonable, prudent operator standard should not be reduced as to
the plaintiffs because Exxon has corporate warranty contracts legally
unrelated to the [plaintiffs'] leases.
... Exxon was required to market the [plaintiffs'] gas in the manner
reasonably mo:;t profitable for the mineral interest owners .... [They] can
not be penalized for Exxon's inability to back its corporate warranty con-
tracts .... Nor should they suffer for Exxon's failure to take the regulato-
ry environment into account in marketing the gas .... Since the market-
ing scheme was Exxon's own, Exxon is at risk when the prudence of the
scheme isjudged. '
The Shelton decision unquestionably conflicts with one common thread of legal
analysis running through the "implied duty to market" cases: that so long as a conflict
of interest does not exist between the lessor and the lessee, the court should not subject
the lessee's reasonable judgment to hindsight. In Shelton, there was in reality no
conflict between the lessor and lessee. At the time Exxon made sales under the
corporate warranty contracts in question, Exxon received seven-eighths of the price
and the royalty owners correspondingly received one-eighth. Such sales were then one
of the best ways to market gas, being a way to pin down for a long period of time what
was then a high price in the intrastate market. Thus, the plaintiffs had benefitted from
64. Id. at 548.
65. Id. at 546.
66. Id. at 549.
67. Amoco, 622 S.W 2d at 563.
68. Shelton, 719 F. Supp. at 549 (emphasis added). The Shelton court also relied on Freeport
Sulphur Co. v. American Sulphur Royalty for the proposition that "supply and demand forces external
to the lease and created, at least in part, by the operator did not affect the implied duty to operate."
Freeport Sulphur Co. v. American Sulphur Royalty, 6 S.W.2d 1039, 1044 (Tex. 1928); see also Amoco




the contracts in their early years when they were economically attractive. For a long
period of time, the royalty owners received the benefits of having their gas marketed
under the warranty contracts. But as the gas market changed, especially with the
passage of NGPA, the long-term warranty contracts became low-priced contracts.
Exxon arguably had no way to know that such a result would ensue when it entered
into the contracts, and only hindsight and the passage of NGPA showed Exxon's action
to be a mistake. However, the royalty owners were permitted to abandon that method
of marketing when it later worked to their detriment, the court deeming it to be, in
effect, unreasonable and imprudent operation.'
The authors feel that the Shelton decision is subject to criticism because it
constitutes the type of second-guessing which should be avoided by the courts. Recall
the statement in First Baptist Church from Professors Williams and Meyers that "[t]he
greatest possible leeway should be indulged the lessee in his decisions about marketing
gas . . . ."" Recall also the professors' position that whatever shortcomings in the
lessee's conduct that may be revealed by hindsight, the covenant to market is breached
only when the lessee does not act as a reasonable prudent operator at the time in
question.' In addition, the Shelton court's reasoning that Exxon had the duty to obtain
the best current price as if the plaintiffs' gas was the only gas Exxon was marketing
would apply whether the gas was dedicated to Exxon's sales contract or not. n If it
were dedicated, the court could simply say such long-term dedication was an
imprudent subjection of the lessor's interest to that of the lessee. As previously stated,
Exxon made a reasonable marketing decision with regard to marketing plaintiffs' gas.
For many years that marketing resulted in the plaintiffs obtaining the highest price
available. By second-guessing Exxon's decision, the Shelton court gave the royalty
owner the best of all possible worlds - the highest price when Exxon guessed
correctly in its marketing efforts and damages for breach of the implied marketing
covenant when Exxon's decisions did not result in the highest price. If the plaintiffs'
gas had been dedicated, a court could also say the dedication was not in the plaintiffs'
best interest and did not result in the highest possible price. Despite the language in
Amoco and Shelton, in many states dedication to a contract will not insulate a lessee
from its duty under the implied marketing covenant to obtain the then current highest
possible price.
Robbins v. Chevron U.S.A.73 is also important to producers because it reflects how
hostile local courts can be towards producers. The facts of the case are critical to show
this degree of hostility. This litigation involved a "take or pay" contract originally
entered into between a producer and a pipeline in 1960. This story is fairly typical of
the scenario which occurred time and time again during the 1980s as producers and
pipelines with such contracts dealt with collapsing resale prices. The contract was
renegotiated in 1978 to extend its term for ten years and to escalate the purchase price
69. Shelton, 719 F. Supp. at 547.
70. First Baptist Church, 579 S.W.2d at 286.
71. See WILLIAMS & MEYERS, supra note 35, § 856.3.
72. Shelton, 719 F. Supp. at 546-49.
73. 785 P.2d 1010 (Kan. 1990).
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of the gas in stages to ultimately the highest price then being paid by three different
pipeline purchasers in an eight-county area. At the time of the amendment, the price
was $0.205 per MCF. By 1982, it had risen to $3.27 per MMBtu but was capped at
$2.289 by a Kansas pricing statute. That statute expired in 1984. The purchaser then
tried unsuccessfully to renegotiate the contract and continued to pay $2.289 per
MMBtu as opposed to the $3.56 contract pirice urged by the producer, Chevron.
Finally, because of the pricing dispute, Chevron shut the wells in from September
1985 until October 1, 1987, during which time it made shut-in royalty payments. In
February 1987, Chevron sued its purchaser for alleged breach of contract and in
October, began selling the gas on the spot market. In July 1988, the royalty owners
brought suit to cancel their leases "alleging that in 1978 Chevron breached its implied
obligation to market their gas by extending the gas purchase contract.., and by the
lack of sales" during the shut-in period. They moved for summary judgment in
October 1988, seeking cancellation of Chevron's leases. The trial court granted the
motion in December 1988 based on what it perceived to be a breach of the implied
marketing covenant - the 1978 contract amendment. The court deemed the leases
canceled as of October 1985 when the wells were shut in and ordered an accounting
for all production after that time.
To these authors, this case highlights the hostility producers encounter in local trial
courts when royalty owners file suit against them. Fortunately for Chevron, the Kansas
Supreme Court had no hesitation in overturning the trial court's summary judgment,
noting that Chevron's conduct should not be judged on the basis of "hindsight" but
upon what an experienced operator of reasonable prudence would have done under the
facts existing at the time.7' The court felt that the 1978 amendment was not "patently
imprudent;"' pursuant to the amendment, the contract price increased dramatically
during a time when gas was in short supply and prices were rising. Certainly, in regard
to the pricing issue, individuals active in the industry, unless they are paid to be
testifying experts for royalty owners, would not see anything imprudent in Chevron's
acts, especially so imprudent as to justify summary judgment. Also, in regard to
Chevron's handling of the take-or-pay dispute, many producers were slow to assert
their rights under take-or-pay contracts and only reluctantly brought suit. To grant a
royalty owner summary judgment without expert testimony on the issue and without
listening to Chevron's explanations for its actions itself is an example of imprudence
on the part of the trial court.
The reception by Chevron at the trial court level exemplifies theproblems producers
often face in rural courts.76 The hostility of the local court in Chevron is further
74. Chevron, 785 P.2d at 1016.
75. Id. at 1015.
76. Trial courts have historically been hostile to producers in favor of royalty owners. See, e.g., Sun
Exploration Co. v. Jackson, 783 S.W.2d 202 (Tex. 1988) (finding that all 12 of the plaintiffs were related
to the judge at least by consanguinity in the fourth degree and one of their attorneys who attended the
trial was the judge's first cousin). In Sun, the trial court granted the plaintiff's request for lease
cancellation for breach of the covenant to explore a highly unusual remedy especially in view of the fact
that the covenant was not recognized in Texas. Can anyone, other than the Texas Supreme Court,




shown by the fact that the trial court canceled the leases for the breach of the implied
marketing covenant. The act of cancellation, as noted by the Kansas Supreme Court,
is not favored by the courts and it clearly cautioned the trial court in this regard. The
Chevron case reflects the reality that the first time the producer receives a remotely
objective review of his actions may likely be at the appellate level, where significant
findings of fact may be established against him by ajudge or jury. This hostility must
be recognized by counsel when providing advice to producers regarding their royalty
payments when they are directly marketing gas.
IV. Methods of Attacking Direct Sales
The royalty owner's first step in attacking direct sales is to determine the type of
royalty clause in the lease. Does his lease contain a market value clause, a proceeds
clause or a hybrid, simply a combination of the two? He must further determine what
economic forces likely motivated his producer and, of course, whether the producer
maintains other leases in the royalty owner's unit or adjoining areas. Also, he needs
to compare his sales prices to other prices in the area by the same producer and third
parties. Finally, he should determine whether his producer's sales activities are part of
a company-wide marketing program involving a marketing affiliate and, if so, when
and why that program was implemented.
A. Capture of Margin or Costs in Affiliate
There are a variety of ways a royalty owner can attack the direct sales by his
producer where the producer captures margin or costs in a marketing affiliate. If a
proceeds lease is involved, and where the producer is using a marketing affiliate, the
royalty owner can argue that there has been a breach in the implied covenant to market
because the proceeds received were too low and there is an inherent conflict of interest
as set forth in Amoco v. Alexander.' In the alternative, he can argue that the sale
between the affiliates was a sham. In regard to the sale to an affiliate, the royalty
owner need only highlight the fact that closer scrutiny is appropriate because the
interests of the lessor and lessee clearly diverge.
If a market value lease is involved, the royalty owner can attack the sale with
evidence of comparable sales in the area and actual expenses. Whether these expenses
were paid to an affiliate of the producer or to a third party should be irrelevant to the
analysis. However, if a valid justification exists for direct sales, any costs paid to
entities not affiliated with the producer should pass judicial scrutiny."
Another way to attack sales to a marketing affiliate not related to the implied
covenant, when margin or costs are captured in the affiliate, is to claim that the sale
was a sham or a fraud and that the real price was the price received by the affiliate. It
is interesting to note that when dealing with sales between affiliates, it is not usually
necessary to show intentional fraud as a prerequisite to disregarding the corporate
he knew from childhood, with whom he goes to church every Sunday, with whom the very fabric of his
life is indelibly intertwined?
77. See supra text accompanying notes 51-55.
78. Parker v. TXO, 716 S.W.2d 644 (Tex. Ct. App. 1986).
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entity. Most state courts have held that "it is sufficient if recognizing the separate
corporate existence would bring about an inequitable result," such "unfairness"
constituting constructive fraud.'
B. Low Sales Price
The implied marketing covenant can also be used to challenge direct sales which
result in a low price being received for the gas even when a marketing affiliate is not
involved. When a marketing affiliate is not used, the challenge is based on the implied
marketing covenant under a proceeds lease or under a market value lease in the event
there are no comparable sales (and thus a review of actual sales price less the
deduction of expenses to make the gas marketable and to transport to market is
warranted). In such challenges, there are three potential claims whereby the royalty
owner could request the trier of fact to substitute his own judgment for or "second
guess" the producer: First, the use of traditional marketing efforts rather than utilizing
brokers, a marketing entity or other special marketing efforts; second, questioning the
producer's direct marketing efforts because of the failure to spot market when long
term prices are low or vice versa, or the failure to market gas to the highest or best
price and market; and finally, improper aggregation or dilution of markets, (see
example for improperly allocating prime markets) by inclusion of third parties' gas or
other production not from that particular royalty owner's land; for example, the
aggregation of production on different pipelines.
A royalty owner's methods of attack described in the first and second claims above
are both based on the use of experts to detail the producer's marketing efforts as being
grossly deficient. If the producer markets directly to a pipeline, an expert can be used
to regale a jury with the producer's ineptitude in not marketing gas directly to end
markets. Similarly, experts can be retained to attack the producer for not marketing
gas on the east coast where the price was higher than on the west coast, where the
producer actually sells the gas. The same type of criticism can be leveled against spot
79. See Castleberry v. Branscum, 721 S.W.2d 270, 272-73 (Tex. 1986); Bell Oil & Gas Co. v.
Allied Chem. Corp., 431 S.W.2d 336 (Tex. 1968); Gentry v. Credit Plan Corp., 528 S.W.2d 571 (Tex.
1975) (holding that a court must disregard the corporate entity if common sense and justice require it);
Texas Oil & Gas Corp. v. Hagen, 683 S.W.2d 24 (Tex. Ct. App. 1984), affd, 31 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 140
(1987), withdrawn, 760 S.W.2d 960 (Tex. 1988).
There were new standards set by the Texas legislature in 1989, which provided that a shareholder
has no liability for a corporation's obligations with respect to any contractual obligation of the
corporation on the basis of actual or constructive fraud or sham, unless the obligee demonstrates that the
holder, owner, or subscriber caused the corporation to be used for the purpose of perpetrating and did
perpetrate an actual fraud on the obligee, primarily for the direct personal benefit of the holder, owner,
or subscriber. However, the legislature did not address or limit the disregard of the corporate fiction
"where the corporate fiction is resorted to as a means of evading an existing legal obligation" or "a
corporation is organized and operated as a mere tool or business conduit of another corporation."
Castleberry, 721 S.W.2d at 272; see also TEx. Bus. CORP. Acr ANN. art. 2.21 (West 1980 & Supp.
1993).
In Oklahoma, see Sautbine v. Keller, 423 P.2d 447 (Okla. 1966) for a discussion on the issue of





sales versus long term sales. Experts, like lawyers, can always be found to say what
the client wants them to say. An example of the problems associated with aggregating
or diluting markets by attributing gas sales back to a particular lessee can best be
illustrated by utilizing the following factual situation: a $3.00 market is directly
accessed via pipeline (a) from five of producer's wells (the A wells). This is a 10
MMBtu day market with each of the five wells producing 2MM day. This market can
also be accessed from the same producer's gas from another series of wells (the B
wells) with different royalty owners by transporting gas first through pipeline (b), then
to pipeline (c). The first set of royalty owners will be referred to as royalty owners A
and the second set of royalty owners as royalty owners B.





ELLS PIPELINE "A" $3.00
MARKET
The producer pays royalty to royalty owners A based on the $3.00 price and pays
royalty to royalty owners B based on sales to the $1.40 market. Royalty owners B sue
the producer for breach of the implied marketing covenant. They cite Cabot Corp. v.
Brown"° for the proposition that the producer has the duty to his royalty owner to
obtain the best price reasonably possible. Based on this case, the royalty owners argue
that they should have a share of the $3.00 market because their gas is accessible to it.
Such a price would be the best price reasonably available and, as royalty owners, they
should be treated as if they were the only lessors of their lessee's gas. Therefore, they
should at least be given proportionate access to the $3.00 market and their proportion-
ate share for royalty purposes. Based on the cited cases, the royalty owners should
have a strong chance of success.
As a variation to the foregoing, the producer, concerned about the royalty owners
B's suit, decides to include that volume in the premium sale (though the gas does not
actually flow that way) by accounting adjustments. Therefore, a fictitious aggregation
occurs where the productions from wells A and wells B are added together. As a result,
80. 754 S.W.2d 104, 106 (Tex. 1987). See supra text accompanying notes 34-41.
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some of the royalty owners A's gas is displaced into the lower-priced spot market, their
royalty check is lowered, and the royalty owners in the B wells will receive a higher
check.
However, if the gas is aggregated in that fashion, royalty owners A could sue on the
same grounds for the breach of the implied marketing covenant, arguing they should
be treated as though theirs was the producer's only gas. They would cite the Alexander
case for the simple assertion that each royalty owner must be treated as if he were the
producer's only royalty owner."' In fact, they have a very appealing and strong
argument because only their gas actually flowed to the market, they are directly
connected to the high price market, and the production from their wells is sufficient
to satisfy that market in its entirety. Royalty owners A have an even stronger argument
for not aggregating their gas to satisfy the high-price market with gas from the wells
in which royalty owners B have an economic interest.
A variation of the foregoing scenario could be that the A wells had only sufficient
production from the producer's interest in those wells to satisfy half of the $3.00
premium market. However, third-party gas from those wells could satisfy the
remainder of the market. The producer, hoping to create the aura of an independent
marketing affiliate and also hoping to market third-party gas for a profit through its
marketing affiliate, sells the third-party gas into the premium market and retains a
percentage of the third party's sale price as its fee. The gas from the B wells is sold
into the low-priced market. The producer's use of a marketing affiliate to directly
market such gas from the A wells to the premium market, without any use of the gas
from royalty owners B to satisfy the market, creates the conflict situation discovered
in Alexander.2 There is a clear conflict - especially when the producer receives a
fee or retains a margin for marketing the third parties' gas. The producer is permitting
third party gas to be sold into the high priced market instead of satisfying it from his
own production on pipelines A and B. To these authors, this variation creates a clear
violation of the implied marketing covenant.
As noted herein, there is much support for the lenient view that a producer's actions
when selling gas should not be subject to a stringent review because that producer has
common interests with his royalty owners to obtain the highest price reasonably
obtainable. However, even under the more charitable view represented by the Chevron
case, a producer's action is subject to a strict review where there is a conflict between
those interests. Clearly, the act of marketing a third party's gas creates a conflict
situation, exacerbated by the collection of a fee. A royalty owner has a very strong
argument that the implied marketing covenant has been breached when a producer
subordinates the royalty owner's interest in having his gas marketed to that of an
unrelated third party.
C. Gas Futures Contracts
Gas futures contracts present a more difficult analytical review than does the typical
gas sales arrangement. 3 However, existing case law does provide support for a
81. See supra text accompanying notes 51-55.
82. Id.




royalty owner claiming the profits from future trades backed up by the producer's
production. Whether the producer uses the traditional futures contract or a variation,
such as a forward contract or swap,' the principal arguments the royalty owner can
marshall are the same. In Frey v. Amoco Production Co. 5 the court noted that the
"amount realized" upon which royalty was to be paid included "the economic benefits"
derived from the lessee's right to develop and explore, a right conferred by the lease. 6
If take-or-pay proceeds constitute economic benefits which are derivative of a
producer's right to develop and explore the leased property, are not the profits
generated by a producer's utilization of futures contracts (contracts covered by its
production) economic benefits derived in part from the royalty owner's production?"
Certainly, in Louisiana at least, an "amount realized" lease permits the royalty owner
to seek the "sum total, the whole or the final effect of the economic benefits.., of the
rights granted by the synallagmatic contract of lease."'
Texas courts also recognize the conveyance of substantial benefits on the lessee and
third parties to the detriment of royalty owners as a breach of the implied covenant to
market gas." Also, the Arkansas Supreme Court in Klein v. Jonese recently stated
that because oil and gas leases are to be construed in favor of the lessor, that oil and
gas leases are a "cooperative venture" to develop the minerals for the mutual benefit
of both parties.9 In Klein, the court held that each party should receive its fractional
division of the gross revenue as contemplated by the lease.' The court, citing Amoco,
said that all benefits grounded on the existence of a lease must be shared in accordance
with the lessee's division of gross revenue, and the lessee may not recoup a substantial
benefit from a lease that is purportedly unrelated to the production of gas.93
The sweeping statements seen in Frey, Amoco, and Klein regarding the correct
interpretation of the intent and purpose of the gas royalty clause provide ampl6 legal
support for a royalty owner to seek the economic benefits his producer derives from
covered futures trading. However, it will be difficult for a royalty owner to quantify
those benefits in a manner that would justify a court awarding him monetary damages
with legal certainty. Moreover, a royalty owner will have difficulty bringing implied
covenant cases because it will normally be very difficult for him to show that his
specific lease conveyed the economic benefit derived from the futures trade, and even
more difficult to show the extent of such benefit. The royalty owner could only show
the fact that the producer had actual production which enabled him to trade in the
futures market with relative safety and that the production was generally related to the
New Natural Gas Business, 13 ENERGY L.J. 313 (1992).
84. Id. at 316-23.
85. 603 So. 2d 166 (La. 1992).
86. Id. at 179-80.
87. Id. at 180.
88. Id.
89. First Baptist Church, 579 S.W.2d at 287.
90. 980 F.2d 521 (8th Cir. 1992).
91. Id. at 531.
92. Id. at 532.
93. Id.
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producer's ability to produce gas from the royalty owner's and others' wells. However,
absent the tying of the futures arrangement to production from a specific area or lease,
such generalities appear tenuous at best as support for a claim for damages. A royalty
owner could retain an expert witness to either theoretically trace the gas molecules
from the royalty owner's well or to perform mathematical calculations to show the
proportional contribution the royalty owner's well theoretically made to the particular
futures transaction. Although, whether a court would accept such a nebulous manner
of proving and quantifying "economic benefit" derived at the royalty owner's expense
is doubtful.
An example of two futures trades which illustrate the potential royalty claims
associated with futures transactions are as follows:
In January, the producer, who is a "natural long," sells the right to sell August gas
at $1.70. The volume optioned is equal to one-half his expected production for that
month. In June, the futures price for August has dropped to $1.25. The producer
closes out the August trade at a net profit of $5,000,000 and sells his August
production in August at a $1.17. In February, the producer sells the same right for one-
half of his September production at $1.68. Due to war in the Middle East and a
volcanic eruption on a small island in the Pacific, causing an August snowfall in the
Midwest, the gas futures price for September soar to $3.75. To avoid a major book
loss, the producer elects to deliver his gas pursuant to the futures contract at $1.70,
creating a lost opportunity cost of $17,000,000.
In the first instance, is not the $5,000,000 an economic benefit as described in
Klein? Would the producer have gambled without the knowledge that his losses would
be limited because of his ability to deliver or sell the equivalent volume of gas to
satisfy his market? In the case of the second trade, market value was clearly not
obtained for the gas. Further, even if a proceeds lease was involved, because of the
existence of a clear conflict of interest, this transaction cannot survive the close
scrutiny called for in First Baptist Church.
Conclusion
The application of the implied marketing covenant to the direct marketing efforts
of a producer is an area where old principles have yet to be applied to a new
methodology of marketing gas. It is the authors' opinion that certain well-worn
shibboleths - such as the idea that the producer has the duty "to obtain the best price
reasonably possible" or the duty "to operate the lease in dispute as if it were his only
lease" - interfere with a thoughtful and correct analysis of the producer's duty under
the implied marketing covenant. The real duty is that the producer should market the
royalty owner's gas as he would his own with the plan of obtaining the best possible
price. The concept that he must obtain "the best price" leads to second-guessing at trial
by a royalty owner's experts and a court. 4 So long as the producer receives seven-
94. Often commentator.; and courts talk about the duty to obtain the "best price" and overlook the
"reasonable" portion of the standard. See Patrick H. Martin, A Modern Look at Implied Covenants to
Explore, Develop and Market Under Mineral Leases, 27 INST. ON OIL & GAS L. & TAX'N 177, 191




eighths of the proceeds, he has all the incentive in the world to get the "best" price.
The proper statement of the lessee's duty under the implied marketing covenant is that
he should "realize the highest price obtainable by reasonable effort.""sS There is more
than a semantic difference between requiring a producer to obtain the "best price
reasonably possible" and requiring the producer to use "reasonable efforts" or to use
the same efforts as a reasonable prudent operator under the same or similar circum-
stances. His standard of care should be only that of an "ordinary prudent operator
under the same or similar circumstances."' However, it does not mean that that price
must be the "best" in absolute terms. A reasonable prudent operator does not always
obtain the "best price" despite his efforts to do so. So long as the producer makes
reasonable efforts to market his gas, his attempts should not be second-guessed unless
there is a clear conflict of interest, as was the case in First Baptist Church, or his
actions demonstrate clear ineptitude or negligence. The kind of clear ineptitude or
negligence that should be necessary to trigger a breach of an implied covenant can be
seen in Waseco Chemical Supply Co. v. Bayou State Oil Corp.97
In such cases, the actions of the producer should be closely scrutinized. Examples
of such conflicts are detailed herein in the discussion relative to the producer's use of
a marketing affiliate to market a third party's gas or when any margin is retained in the
producer's affiliate. But as noted in TXO v. Parker, even where a conflict exists, sales
to an affiliate below "market price" can be justified by unique circumstances, such as
the quality of the gas.
In addition to the implied marketing covenant, the sale to the marketing affiliate can
be attacked as being a sham or fraud as in Castleberry." This challenge should find
especially fertile ground in Texas.
Finally, the authors do not believe that internal marketing costs are properly
captured by producers and deducted from the royalty owner's share of production
proceeds. Such practice is not justifiable in view of past practices and performance
under the royalty clause in oil and gas leases and is a conflict of interest under the
implied marketing covenant.
(1985). The issue is not that the price in question is the best available or better prices are available; the
issue is, did the lessee use reasonable efforts?
95. First Baptist Church, 579 S.W.2d at 285 (quoting MERRILL, supra note 34, at 212-14).
96. Cabot, 754 S.W.2d at 106.
97. 371 So. 2d 305 (La. Ct. App.), writ denied, 374 So. 2d 656 (La. 1979).
98. See supra note 79.
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